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The purpose of this department is to afford an opportunity for
informal exchange of ideas on matters related to legal education.
Typical comments will range from about 1200 to about 3000 words
in length, and may either advocate innovations in curriculum- or
teaching method or respond critically to previously published ma-
terial.
"SKILLS" AND UNDERSTANDING
DAVID F. CAVERS *
An aptly devised poll of law teachers would, I am sure, disclose consider-
able agreement that legal education should concern itself with the law-
yer's skills much more than heretofore. But I suspect that the same poll
would also reveal extensive disagreement as to the reasons why, and the ways
in which, this objective should be pursued.
Of course, one could safely predict disagreement in defining the skills.
In passing current, the term "skills" has been little burdened by the luggage
of particularization.' When those of us who have not yet done so come to
examine closely and sort out the facts to which we have applied the syimbol,
naturally we shall find that we haven't all been talking about quite the same.
things. But, in this case, consequential differences in objectives are not
likely, I think, to turn on such questions of definition. They are more likely
to stem from another ambiguity which the term conceals. This deserves
some attention; the term is one we must be prepared to live with.
When we speak of the lawyer's skills, I believe we often have in mind
simply the tasks which the lawyer must perform, with little concern for the
level of proficiency displayed in their performance. "Drafting," we say, "is
one of the lawyer's basic skills," and then, without consciousness of possible
self-contradiction, we go on to deplore the low estate of legal draftsmanship.
On the other hand, I think there are also many times when the qualitative
connotation of "skills" is clearly uppermost, when we are referring not simply
to a kind of job that lawyers can and do perform, but rather to the ability to
do that kind of job expertly. In other words, we are referring primarily to
lawyers' skillfulness.
* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
IThe AALS Committee on Teaching and Examination Methods was obliged to
break much new ground when, for a general meeting of the Association in December,
1947, it undertook to prepare an analytical list of lawyers' skills. The list, reflecting
largely the work of Professors Henry Weihofen and Frank Strong, is discussed in
HANDBOOK OF THE ASsociATIox or A=nicAN LAw ScHoots 75-80 (1947). Given our
oft-repeated claim that we teach our students "to think like lawyers," the store of
published writings which consider how lawyers think is surprisingly scanty. Clar-
ence Morris' volume, How LAwYmRs TmN7x (1937), is less comprehensive than its title
may suggest.
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There is enough of each ingredient in "skills" to divert attention from the
fact that a choice may be involved When we call for more emphasis on
lawyer's skills in legal education. Do we mean only that law students should
become better acquainted with the jobs lawyers have to do, or that we should
go furtlier'and seek to train them to exercise the lawyer's skills skillfully?
For "reasons that I shall note later in this comment, I am persuaded that
the second of these alternatives states an objective that the law schools prob-
ably cannot achieve and in any event should not pursue. I have therefore
found m)sdlf drawn to the first alternative. Certainly, it is possible of at-
tainment. We can, if we choose, give law students experience in the un-
skillful exercise of lawyer's skills.
Is this one of those ideas which, when we think about them, we call un-
thinkable? How could any law school have the hardihood to set out to train
its students to exercise skills but not skillfully?
I agree; the last question is rhetorical-but only so long as the goal of the
study of skills is conceived to be training. This is not necessary. If, instead,
the objective of such work is recognized as understanding, it then becomes
possible to' defend the proposition that the law student's education should
give him some experience in the various jobs that a lawyer has to perform
without at -the same time undertaking to make the student expert in all or any
of them.
To the question, "Understanding of what?," I should be tempted to re-
spond, "Understanding of the adjudicative and legislative processes," and
incorporate by reference that illuminating paper by Lon L. Fuller which
appeared in the preceding issue of the Joum.AL. However, I shall take in-
stead a simpler position: the study of skills will promote understanding of
the legal materials which traditionally the law student has been called upon
to study.
The problem of understanding legal materials 3 is essentially one of appre-
ciating the significance they have for the lawyer when he is seeking to resofve
the various, questions that he is called upon to answer. What, in a given
situation, may be the bearing of a given case (or statute, contract, or theory)
on a decision that the lawyer must reach? The problem of significance in this
sense is persuasive and commonplace, and hence is both important and neg-
lected. It calls for a Vaihinger. Indeed, a title awaits him-and in Ameri-
can: The Philosophy of "So What ?"
Questions of "So what?" possess peculiar importance to the lawyer be-
cause he, par excellence, is a man of decision and action, a fact we tend to
overlook in our preoccupation with the analytical and deliberative aspects of
his work. Each non-routine operation of the lawyer is likely to involve him
in a series of decisions as he determines upon action calculated not only to
resolve the issues immediately before him, but also favorably to predispose,
so far as practicable, all those future questions that he can foresee may be
. 9 Fuller, *hat the Law Schools qan Uontribute to the Making of Lawyers, 1
3. LEGAL ED. 189 (1948).
1 3 1 shall use, "legal materials" to refer to judicial and administrative decisions,
statutes, regulations, contracts, deeds, and other legal instruments, and also to the
theories of legal writers. Of course, greater emphasis on lawyers' skills would In-
crease the attention devoted to the non-case materials.
1 JouBNAL or LEGAL ED.NO.3
[VOL. I
implicated in his present action. He must, therefore, constantly examine
legal materials in relation to the various uses to which he may wish to put
them. Do they advance or impede his plans; to what extent can they be
adapted to his purposes, to what extent disregarded? Like the architect and
builder, he must know the limits of load and tension that his materials will
bear. Especially is this true when questions of social policy are at issue.
The problem of the significance of legal materials is of critical importance
to the student of law as a system of social controls. In approaching given
legal materials as evidencing the social norms and sanctions he is examining,
he, too, must ask, "So what?" Moreover, he must often concern himself
with the answers to that question found by the practicing lawyers, since fre-
quently their answers determine the social significance of the legal materials
with which they deal. Consider for example, the significance of a rule that
the bar deems unenforceable because of difficulties of proof.
If the problem of the significance of legal materials is recognized as in-
tegral to the jobs that lawyers do, it may be superfluous to argue the potential
value of the study of the lawyer's skills, even though such study stops well
short of training the student to exercise the skills skillfully. I am reluctant,
however, to leave the problem of significance 'without an illustration. Ac-
cordingly, at the risk of elaborating the 6bvious, I shall follow through the
stages of one hypothetical litigation to note the diversity of ways in which a
lawyer may be compelled to look at a single reported decision.
4
For my example, I shall call upon an attorney who does yeomanjservice in
my courses, one L. L. Bee of the city of Langdell,*Ames. I shill confront
him with the case of Eks v. Wye, decided by an intermediate court 6f appeals
in Ames in 1905, cited half a dozen times since, usually distingzuished, never
squarely applied.
Mr. Bee's concern with the Eks case springs from the fact that, if the case
is still alive as a precedent-an arguable proposition-then, arguably, it
would invalidate a provision that he wishes to include in a contract he is
drafting. Mr. Bee is satisfied that the negative of both conditions is the
more probable, but as a draftsman he must reckon with the contingencies
that the other party (1) will fail to accept his forecast ofjudicial action and
(2) will be right. These present more than a problem in drafting; he must
be prepared also to deal with possible repercussions of the Eks case in ne-
gotiations after his contract draft has been examined by counsel for the other
party.
Mr. Bee's client concludes that the interests at stake make it worth while
to run whatever risks Eks v. Wye may involve after the contract has been
carefully drawn to minimize them. But, though the other party acquiesces
and signs the contract, controversy later develops and litigation threatens.
Obviously, as negotiations for settlement begin, Mr. Bee must make a third
set of reckonings. The hypothetical controversies that he postulated before
have now been crystallized in an actual situation; his reckoning must be
predicated on the specific pattern of certainties and uncertainties it presents.
4 Examples could as readily have -been provided in which the legal material under
consideration would be not a case but, say, a contract or a regulation, and the ques-
tions involved would relate not to litigation but to planning and executing a series
of business transactions or a governmental policy.
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The settlement breaks down (they don't settle readily in Ames, I find),
and trial impends. Mr. Bee reworks Eks v. Wye a fourth time with a variety
of objectives in view: for suggestions as to the facts to be ascertained in
advance of trial and for guidance in deciding questions of pleading, trial
tactics, and requests to charge.
And so to trial and a judgment for the other party. Eks v. Wye has com-
manded the trial judge's allegiance in a series of rulings contrary to Mr.
Bee's contentions. Now arises the question of appeal (with negotiated set-
tlement a possible alternative), and, with each of these alternatives in view,
Eks v. Wye is examined a fifth time-but for the first time in relation to a
record.
Settlement having failed, appeal is taken-to the same court that decided
Eks v. Wye years ago. Now Mr. Bee must resolve questions (heretofore
considered more generally) of just how to handle the EPks case in his appel-
late brief and oral argument. For a sixth time, therefore, Mr. Bee studies
the case with a fresh problem before him, and a new set of decisions to make.
His efforts are in vain; the intermediate court does not disavow its off-
spring. It upholds the trial court and cites the Eks case with approval. A
whole succession of new problems now confronts the defeated Mr. Bee and
his dispirited client. Settlement on hard terms? Petition for certiorari? If
granted, how to overcome the mistaken views of the courts below? The
rehabilitated Eks v. Wye must be examined for a seventh time with the deci-
sion of these particular questions in view. They are necessarily different
from those Mr. Bee has heretofore resolved, however many elements in com-
mon they possess.
Finally, and with regret, I must report that the Ames Supreme Court per-
sists in disagreement with Mr. Bee, leaving him sadder and wiser and his
client rather less affluent.
The seven stages through which Mr. Bee has been carried have, of course,
their counterparts in the labors of opposing counsel. However, at each stage,
Eks v. Wye.will have a different significance for him than for Mr. Bee. And,
as if fourteen separate significations were not enough, the case has be-
come of consequence to still other persons, for whom its significance is still
different.
Mr. Bee's litigation has been watched with interest by his client's trade-
association counsel. As he observes the cobwebs brushed off Eks v. Wye
he begins to worry. That decision may have broader implications. So he,
too, studies the revitalized opinion, with a view to a long talk with the chair-
man of the association's committee on legislation. I shall not, however,
pursue the sequence of appraisals and reappraisals of the .tks case which
this conference portends.
At Ames University, Eks v. Wye has also won attention. The law re-
view editors spot Mr. Bee's case at the intermediate appellate level. Now,
of course, the editors do not look at Eks v. Wye in the way either Mr. Bee
or his opponent looked at it at any stage in their litigation. Rather the editors
view it with something of the disinterested aloofness of the bench (for whom,
I should add, the Eks case has also yielded a set of distinctive significations).
The editors, however, form a bench that precedent binds lightly, and they
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have no paternal ties to .Eks v. Wye. Accordingly, both it and the recent
Ames decision upholding it are exposed to criticism on grounds of social
and economic policy, vaguely articulated but reinforced by the citation of a
case in 37 South Dakota and another from the Exchequer Chamber.
In the meantime, discussions with the review editors have awakened the
interest of the Contracts teacher at the Ames University Law School in the
Eks z. Wye problem. So in due course the opinion in that case, accompanied
by the new decision of the Ames Supreme Court, goes into the mimeo-
graphed materials with which the teacher is striving to bridge certain de-
plorable gaps he finds in the casebook.
It is through this medium that the Ames law students will come to meet
Eks v. Wye. They will abstract it conscientiously against the next day's
class. They will extract a holding from the opinion, and they will regard
that holding as the Law. But for them what will be the significance of the
case or the proposition they distill from it? In the context of what decisions
to be made and action to be taken will they view it? Will they appraise it as
Mr. Bee did when, say, he was drafting the contract and advising his client?
Or will they look at it as Mr. Bee or his adversary saw it pending the argu-
ment of their case in the Ames Supreme Court? Or as the trade association
counsel viewed it? Or as the law review editor? Or as the law teacher,
patching up his casebook?
Probably the students will adopt none of these viewpoints. In all likeli-
hood the problem of significance will not occur to them, for they will have
only to decide what Eks v. Wye "decided," not what should be done or not
done in the light of that decision. They are dealing with a question abstract-
ed from actuality, in which no one other than a law student would be in-
terested except as part of some other question calling for decision and action.
Now it is true that in the classroom the teacher may ask a student to make
impromptu one of those decisions with reference to Eks v. Wye over which
Mr. Bee and his adversary labored. Or the teacher may point out the sig-
nificance that the case would be likely to have for either or both attorneys at
this or that juncture of their controversy. Sometimes the teacher's tendency
to raise such points may be so persistent that the more perceptive students
will come to think about them in preparing for class.
Since, of course, it would be impracticable in class to appraise all the cases
deserving of study from all or even many of the standpoints from which
their significance may have to be gauged in practice, doubtless we must con-
tinue to rely largely upon this combination of occasional "what-would-you-
have-done" questions with professorial asides and allusions. But consider
how much more effective the combination would be if, at some other points in
their study, the students exposed to it were being called upon to perform
some of the lawyer's jobs which daily require him to make up his mind as to
significance of legal materials and to act on the basis of his decision. In thus
experiencing the painful but stimulating business of decision, the students
would begin to gain insight into problems and processes well before they
could hope to acquire skillfulness in action.
Whatever its declared objectives, much of the current experimentation in
acquainting law students with the lawyer's skills does compel the students to
confront problems of decision and action of the sort that confront the lawyer,
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and so inevitably brings them to deal with questions of "So what ?" r Thus
made sensitive to such problems and conscious of their importance, the law
student is, likely to become increasingly aware of them in the materials he
studies in non-experimental courses. The experimental work therefore gives
promise of enriching the whole program of study.
Unfortunately, the realization of this promise is threatened by two dangers.
One is the danger that the quest for greater understanding will be sub-
ordinated to an attempt to produce virtuosos in some or all of the lawyers'
techniques. The other is the danger that the students' continuing want of
skillfulness in those techniques will convince teachers and students alike that
the study of skills is not worth while.
' These hazards bear consideration, and I think this should begin with a
proposition that has attained the status of a saw among law-school deans and
professors, one long used to squelch alumni who make bold to suggest a little
more emphasis on the "practical." "The Law School can't teach every-
thing," the proposition runs, "so we have to leave to the law office the things
the student can learn better there."
It is too bad that this saw has always seen service as a terminus rather'
than as a starting point for discussion. It is valid in its recognition of the
facts that legal education must continue beyond graduation and that the law
office is better equipped than the law school to do some parts of the educa-
tional job. Yet its implied invitation for searching inquiry into the respective
roles of law school and law office has been little heeded. On the contrary,
we have tended to take the present division of labor pretty much for granted,
If, however, such an investigation were made, it would, I am sure, restrain
those who are tempted to take over from the law office the task of developing
skillfulness in all or most of the lawyer's jobs. To the extent that skillful-
ness reflects more than natural talent, it is largely the product of repeated
experience, and that the law school is not equipped to provide. Moreover, a
vital ingredient in the lawyer's skillfulness is his ability to perceive and re-
spond wisely to elements in a situation that are obscure or difficult to evaluate
-personality factors, for example. The law school, not being the "clinical
lawyer-school" judge Frank has envisaged,6 can seldom fabricate situations
that are apt for the cultivation of such expertness in perception, though they
may reveal the character of the difficulty.7 Again, as Professor Fuller
warns,8 absorption in training for skillfulness would divert the student from
5 A survey that I recently conducted for the AALS Committee on Teaching and
i xamination lMethods surprised me by the extent and variety of the experimentation
it disclosed. It is reported in Ass'NT OF Am.LAw SCHOOLS, PROGRAM AND RlEPORTS
OF COMMITEES 93 (1948).
6 See Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L. 3. 1303 (1947); Why Not A
Clinical Lawyer-School? 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). Judge Frank's proposals,
though unlikely of realization, represent a continuing stimulus to the study of the
lawyer's skills.
7 The fact that hypothetical problems illustrative of the types of jobs that lawyers
do are inadequate for the development of expertness should not cause us to under-
value them as means of inducing students to appraise the significance of the legal
materials they are studying or of developing in them a better understanding of
legal processes.
8 See Fuller, supra note 2.
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the study of objective problems to an attempt at self-improvement. The
goals of preparation for a profession are and ought to be different from
those of a "personal-success course."
But, though such considerations reinforce the view that the law schools
have been wise in abstaining from training for skillfulness in the exercise of
skills, the failure to study the division of labor is reflected in the failure to
seek, in the study of skills, effective ways of assuring continuity and interac-
tion in education between law school and law office.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the transition from law-school work to
law-office work is the abruptness of the.change, tempered in the large offices
by the initial assignment of neophytes to the writing of legal memoranda.
Memoranda apart, the law clerk is plunged into a succession of tasks in-
volving unfamiliar problems and processes. Moreover, as he progresses in
his career, he does not find himself returning to draw increasingly upon his
law-school learning. The contrary is the case; he may even have to unlearn
some of the over-simplified conceptions of law and its processes that he ac-
quired while he was learning the Law without much regard to its significance.
The study of the lawyer's skills could forge many links between school and
office, even though the law schools did not purport to assume the law office's
job of developing expertness. If, in his law study, a student could take part
in representative law jobs, even though posed by hypothetical situations, the
insights he would gain would be likely to persist when he engaged in the same
jobs in practice; to change the metaphor, they would provide growing points
for further development. Of course, the extent to which his student ex-
perience could render him perceptive would depend in no small measure on
his instructor's own insight, imagination, and sensitivity to the problem of
significance. But increased emphasis on the study of the lawyer's jobs would
at the least enlarge the opportunity for instruction that would have continu-
ing educative value.
The same change in emphasis would also enable the law schools to draw
more effectively on the knowledge and talent of the practicing bar. It is a
commentary on the lack of continuity between law school and law office that
the schools have been able to make so little use of practitioners-in sharp
contrast to the schools of medicine. The reason, however, is plain: the law
schools have not been concerned with those aspects of professional work that
are developed in experience at the bar. They have concentrated on questions
which a recent graduate may often be more competent to answer than a dis-
tinguished lawyer at the peak of his career. Fortunately, however, as greater
attention is directed to the jobs that lawyers do, ways are likely to be found
to utilize the experienced lawyer: in fact, some experiments are already
exploiting this generally available resource.
An invigoration of legal research will certainly result from greater con-
tinuity between school and office in law study. For legal research to remain
vital, it must concern itself increasingly with the problem of significance-
with questions of "So what?" In their pursuit, closer scrutiny will be re-
quired than has heretofore been given to the jobs that lawyers do. This,
however, would follow naturally from increased attention in the classroom
to lawyers' jobs, for, among law schools, the focus of interest in teaching has
never been far from that in research.
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These considerations should, I think, reconcile law teachers to the prospect
that the growing experimentation in study directed to the lawyer's skills will
not, at the end of three or four years' schooling, yield polished draftsmen,
wise and resourceful counselors, astute negotiators, and effective advocates.
Resigned to the limitations to which the new work must remain subject, law
teachers may so shape it as to maximize its contribution to the student's
understanding of the materials of his study and, concurrently, to augment
the continuity in the processes of education between law school and law
office.
